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In this chapter, we analyze the cause of the persistent deﬂation in Japan
by estimating the long-run Phillips curve equation using the gross domes-
tic product (GDP) deﬂator and the estimated GDP gap. We also document
the conduct of monetary policy in the face of a zero lower bound of inter-
est rates. The gradually accelerating deﬂation has been the origin of the two
serious problems of the Japanese economy, the nonperforming loan prob-
lem and the increasing national debt.
The proﬁt margin of Japanese banks has been too small to cover the in-
creased default risk after the crush of the bubble. Banks have not suc-
ceeded in increasing their lending margin under a strong competitive
pressure from government-backed ﬁnancial institutions and weakened
borrowers under a deﬂationary economy. Moreover, under the terms and
conditions of government capital injection in March 1999, banks are le-
gally required to maintain and increase loans to small- and medium-sized
ﬁrms. Because of this situation, banks often disregard the internal model-
based required lending margin to make new loans to small companies.
Corresponding to the ﬂow-proﬁt ﬁgures, the capital position of Japanese
banks has been deteriorating.
National debt has been increasing rapidly. Due to the declining tax rev-
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for helpful comments.enue and the successive budgetary stimulus packages, the debt-GDP ratio
had reached 157 percent by the end of 2003. With an extremely large bud-
get deﬁcit and declining nominal GDP, this ratio was increasing by 8 to 9
points a year. Even though the net debt-GDP ratio is still at 66 percent, it
is likely to surpass 100 percent by 2008.
The Japanese economy was in a very serious situation in early 2003. In
spite of the zero interest rate policy by the Bank of Japan, the GDP deﬂa-
tor was falling more than 2 percent per annum. The budget deﬁcit was
more than 8 percent of GDP, and ﬁscal consolidation was almost impos-
sible under zero or negative nominal growth. The Nikkei 225 stock price
index had fallen to only one-ﬁfth of its peak in 1989. The capital of major
banks and life insurance companies was running out very quickly due to
the increasing nonperforming loans and falling stock prices.
Since short-term interest rates were already zero, conventional monetary-
policy tools had lost eﬀectiveness. Usually a potent monetary-policy weapon,
an open market purchase of short-term government papers by the Bank of
Japan was no longer eﬀective because zero interest base money and zero in-
terest short-term government papers are now perfect substitutes. Long-
term bond yields had fallen to extremely low levels. A further injection of
base money was not likely to push down long-term rates further.
Since the spring of 2003, the Japanese economy has shown a surprising
recovery (see ﬁg. 5.1). While it is very diﬃcult to identify the causes of this
turnaround, we can list the possible contributing factors:
1. The new governor of the Bank of Japan, Toshihiko Fukui, skillfully
used “announcement eﬀects” of monetary policy by showing that he is se-
riously ﬁghting against deﬂation. While we could not expect much from the
individual policy actions taken by the bank, Fukui succeeded in improving
the expectations of the Japanese business community. We may call it the
“placebo eﬀect” of monetary policy.
2. The rescue of the failing Resona Bank in the spring of 2003 changed
the perceived risk proﬁle of shares of major Japanese banks. When the gov-
ernment nationalized the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan and Nippon
Credit Bank in 1998, the shareholders’ equity was wiped out. On the other
hand, the government saved the shareholders of Resona Bank with public
money when it injected capital to the bank. This rescue operation changed
the risk of bank stocks and started a “moral hazard rally” in the market.
3. The very rapid expansion of the Chinese economy induced an export
boom for Japanese manufacturing companies. Japanese exports to China
grew about 30 percent in 2003.
4. The massive oﬃcial interventions in the foreign exchange market
kept the yen relatively weak. The government bought JPY 32.6 trillion
worth of U.S. dollars (about US$ 300 billion) in ﬁscal year 2003 that ended
March 2004. This is more than 6 percent of the Japanese GDP and about
twice the value of Japanese current account surplus in the same year.
204 Mitsuhiro FukaoAs a result, the real GDP grew almost 5 percent in ﬁscal year 2003, and
the deﬂationary gap has shrunk considerably. Corporate proﬁts, private in-
vestments, and employment situations have shown a steady recovery.
However, the GDP deﬂator is still falling about 1.5 percent per annum
at the time of this writing. Given the estimated potential growth rate of 1.5
percent, the Japanese economy still faces a risk of having a negative nom-
inal growth again in the near future.
5.2 Gradually Accelerating Deﬂation
Deﬂation in Japan is steadily accelerating.1 Figure 5.2 shows the GDP
deﬂator and core consumer price index (CPI) since 1985. They are season-
ally adjusted annual rates (SAAR) and show fairly erratic movements.
Both of them are adjusted for value added tax (VAT) increases in 1989 and
1997. The ﬁgure also shows their trends estimated by Hodrick-Prescott
(HP) Filter with the conventional parameter for quarterly time series. The
trend of core CPI started to fall in 1998, and that of GDP deﬂator started
to fall in 1995. The GDP deﬂator deﬂation rate has been larger than that of
the CPI because the upward bias of CPI is more pronounced than that of
the deﬂator. By the end of 2003, the GDP deﬂator deﬂation rate was more
than 2 percent and was still accelerating. Figure 5.3 shows that the general
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Fig. 5.1 GDP growth rate, annual rate after three-quarter moving average
1. In late 2004, the GDP deﬂator was revised upward signiﬁcantly. The government intro-
duced chain-weight based deﬂator ﬁgures and the rate of deﬂation in 2002–2004 was revised
upward by about one point. Since I could not update the analysis in this chapter all the tables
and ﬁgures are based on the old statistics. As a result, you may ﬁnd that my analysis of the
Japanese deﬂation is rather pessimistic.Fig. 5.2 CPI and GDP deﬂator deﬂation rates
Source: Japan Center for Economic Research (2003).
Note:GDP deﬂator inﬂation rate is adjusted for changes in consumption tax rate in 1989 and
1997.
Fig. 5.3 GDP deﬂator price level (unadjusted 1995   1.0)
Note: Adjusted for changes in consumption tax in April 1989 and April 1997.price level measured by the GDP deﬂator has fallen by about 12 percent
from the peak in early 1994 to the ﬁrst quarter of 2004.
While the public discussions on monetary policy and deﬂation generally
focus on CPI, the development of the GDP deﬂator is more important for
the health of the Japanese economy. The corporate proﬁt and labor income
depend on the nominal GDP that is the product of GDP deﬂator and real
GDP. Tax revenue is also dependent on the nominal GDP. The gap be-
tween the CPI and GDP deﬂator widened in the 1990s, and the average gap
over the past ﬁve years (1999–2003) was 1.2 percent. This means that even
if the Bank of Japan can stabilize the CPI at zero inﬂation, the GDP deﬂa-
tor will be falling at 1.2 percent. Therefore, in this chapter, we look into the
development of the GDP deﬂator deﬂation rate.
The Bank of Japan pointed out that the GDP deﬂator exaggerates the rate
of deﬂation due to the very rapid fall in computer prices and the Paasche
index bias.2 The private investment deﬂator seems to overstate the deﬂa-
tion by about 3 percent since the ﬁrst quarter of 2003 because its trend de-
ﬂation rate jumped from 2 percent to 5 percent. However, the bias of the
GDP deﬂator will be much smaller, at most by about 0.5 percent, because
the weight of private investment is about 15 percent of total nominal GDP.
Thus, even if we removed this downward bias of the GDP deﬂator, the
GDP deﬂator is still falling by about 2 percent instead of 2.5 percent. In
this context, we have to note that the Bank of Japan paper does not men-
tion the possible upward bias in the GDP deﬂator (Koga 2003). Because
most price indexes do not take account of the quality changes in goods and
services, the GDP deﬂator does have some upward bias from this source.
Moreover, the Bank of Japan is not disputing the validity of nominal GDP.
Therefore, the correction of the downward bias of GDP deﬂator due to the
Paasche bias means that the real growth rate will also be adjusted down-
ward by the same amount.
The deceleration of inﬂation in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s and the accel-
eration of the deﬂation rate in the second half of the decade strongly sug-
gest that Japan has maintained a deﬂationary GDP gap since the collapse
of the bubble economy in the late 1980s. I estimated the size of the GDP
gap with the Financial Study Group of Japan Center for Economic Re-
search based on the conventional production-function approach.3 The es-
timation was made with the following procedure:
1. A Cobb-Douglas production function was estimated with real GDP,
labor input (man-hour based), and capital adjusted for capacity utilization.
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2. See Koga (2003). James Harrigan pointed out this factor at the meeting in June 2004. I
had investigated this problem in the Japan Center for Economic Research (2004) paper in de-
tail but did not include the conclusions in the earlier version of this chapter. I am summariz-
ing the main points in my analysis in the text.
3. See the data appendix of this chapter and Japan Center for Economic Research (2004)
for the details of the estimation procedure.The factor-income share was used to calibrate the parameter of the pro-
duction function. The trend of the residual of the production function cor-
responds to the growth of total factor productivity (TFP) of the Japanese
economy:
ln Yt   0.29 ln Kt   0.71 ln Lt   ln TFP t, where
Yt   real GDP,
Kt   capital adjusted for capacity utilization,
Lt   labor input measured by man-hours, and
TFP t   estimated TFP.
Since this TFP growth rate is estimated from the residual of the production
function, the TFP reﬂects possible biases in the GDP deﬂator. If the GDP
deﬂator exaggerates the deﬂation rate, the measured TFP growth rate also
exaggerates the potential growth rate by the same amount.
2. Estimate the maximum inputs by connecting the cyclical peaks of the
labor hour and capacity utilization. In this process, the peaks of labor force
were identiﬁed for the working-age population and the retirement-age
population separately. The peaks of working hours were identiﬁed for
overtime hours and normal working hours separately because the normal
working hours declined due to the changes in the labor-relations law.
3. The maximum production potential is estimated from the production
function in step 1 and the maximum labor and capital inputs in step 2. The
gap between this maximum GDP and the actual GDP is the unadjusted
GDP gap:
Unadjusted GDP gap   Maximum GDP   Actual GDP.
Figure 5.4 shows the estimated potential GDP growth rate that is deﬁned
as the changes in the maximum GDP. The potential growth rate for the 
past two years has been about 1.5 percent a year. The large negative labor
contribution from 1988 to 1994 and from 1997 to 2000 was due to the
introduction of the ﬁve-day workweek. The TFP was estimated from the
smoothed residual term of the equation, and it has been increasing at
about 1 percent per annum in recent years. This potential growth rate is im-
portant because it also determines the growth rate of “natural level of
GDP” in the next step.
4. The “natural level of real GDP” was calculated as a parameter, Gn, in
the estimated long-run Phillips curve relationship (table 5.1). This equation
assumes that the expected rate of inﬂation depends on the past inﬂation
rates. The table shows that the natural level of real GDP is lower than the
maximum GDP by 3.249 percent:
Natural level of GDP   Maximum GDP   3.249%.
At the natural level of GDP, the inﬂation rate will be steady. If the real GDP
is below this natural level, the inﬂation rate gradually decelerates and be-
208 Mitsuhiro Fukaocomes negative. If the real GDP is above the natural level, the inﬂation rate
accelerates.
In estimating the Phillips curve with the data since 1985, we found that
the acceleration of deﬂation rate in the second half of the 1990s was much
slower than the deceleration of inﬂation in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s. This
is probably due to the fact that it is easier to reduce the wage increases than
to accelerate the pace of wage reductions.4 Therefore, we assumed a struc-
tural change in the equation when the GDP deﬂator started to fall in 1994.
The acceleration parameter under deﬂation, 0.081 (0.081  0.348 – 0.267),
was only one-quarter of the parameter under inﬂation, 0.348.
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Fig. 5.4 Potential growth rate
Source: Japan Center for Economic Research (2004).
4. See Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003) for evidence of downward wage rigidity in Japan.
Table 5.1 Estimated price equation with GDP gap (1985/Q1–2003/Q4)
Speciﬁcation 
πt= α×  ∑
4
i 1
πt – i/4 + (1 – α) × ∑
8
i 5
πt – i /4 + β×(Gt – Gn) + γ×DUM × (Gt – Gn) + εt
πt = 0.551 ×∑
4
i 1
πt – i/4 + 0.449 ×∑
8
i 5
πt – i πt–i/4 + 0.348 × (Gt – (–3.249))– 0.267 × DUM × (Gt – (–3.249)) + εt
(2.51) (2.46) (2.23) (4.13) (1.69)
Adjusted R2 = 0.43; Standard error = 1.47
Source: Japan Center for Economic Research (2004).
Notes: π = GDP-deﬂator inﬂation rate; G = unadjusted GDP gap; Gn = natural level of GDP gap; and
DUM = dummy variable. From 1985 to 1993, DUM = 0; after 1994, DUM = 1.5. The adjusted GDP gap is estimated by adding this natural level of
GDP gap, 3.249, to the unadjusted GDP gap. In the following, we refer to
this adjusted GDP gap as the GDP gap:
Adjusted GDP gap   Unadjusted GDP gap   3.249%.
Figure 5.5shows the estimated GDP gap with the GDP deﬂator inﬂation
rate. Since SAAR data are highly erratic, we used a three-quarter moving
average of SAAR series for the chart. The GDP gap hit the peak of 2.5 per-
cent in 1990 and started to fall. It became negative in mid-1992, and the
deﬂationary environment has continued since then. The gap narrowed to
zero in early 1997 when the planned increase of the VAT stimulated con-
sumption on consumer durables and housing. However, the gap became
very large by mid-1999 due mainly to the ﬁnancial crisis from the fall of
1997 until early 1999. Although capital injection and the cyclical recovery
brieﬂy narrowed the gap in 2000, the Japanese economy fell into a deeper
trough in 2002. We can see that the deﬂationary gap reached 6.9 percent of
the natural level of GDP in the ﬁrst quarter of 2002.
Our estimated GDP gap ﬁgures and the Phillips curve show that the
widening GDP gap led to the acceleration of deﬂation from 1995 to 2003.
This result indicates that the aggregate-demand shocks were more impor-
tant than the aggregate-supply shocks as a cause of persistent deﬂation in
Japan. Monetary policy should have responded more strongly to stem the
deﬂationary pressure from the demand side.
Since then, the Japanese economy recovered slowly until mid-2003 and
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Fig. 5.5 Estimated GDP gap and deﬂation rate
Source: Japan Center for Economic Research (2004).the growth rate accelerated. By the ﬁrst quarter of 2004, the GDP gap had
declined to less than 4 percent.
5.3 Deﬂation and Nonperforming Loan Problem
Banking in Japan has become an unproﬁtable, structurally depressed in-
dustry. Excluding capital gains realized by selling shares and real estate,
Japan’s banks as a group have been in the red since the year ending March
1994 (ﬁscal year 1993). The primary cause of this is a low proﬁt margin and
a high level of loan losses. In this section, I rely on Fukao (2003) and ex-
plain the performance of the Japanese banking sector since the mid-1990s.
Table 5.2 shows the proﬁt-loss accounts of all commercial banks. In the
ten years from ﬁscal year 1992 to ﬁscal year 2002, banks made around JPY
10 trillion each year as lending margin (row A, deﬁned as interest and div-
idends earned minus interest paid). Revenue from such sources as bond
and currency dealing and service charges were about JPY 3 trillion (row B).
This includes all other revenue except capital gains realized on stocks and
real estate. Revenues from banks’ principal operations therefore amount
to roughly JPY 13 trillion yen a year (row A   row B).
Total costs—including personnel and other operating expenses—were
over JPY 7 trillion (row C). Operating costs declined during the 1998–2000
period because of cost-cutting measures. It is likely to be diﬃcult to con-
tinue that pace of cost cutting. Certainly, the banks may cut labor costs fur-
ther by reducing employment and cutting average compensation. But the
banks have to invest heavily in information technology to remain compet-
itive.
In the 1990s, banks stinted on improving systems because of the preoccu-
pation with bad-loan problems, and now they have poor-quality computer
systems. Thus, for example, the zengin electronic fund transfer system,
which is the main payment system among bank customers, cannot handle
two-byte codes, so it cannot send customer names and messages in kanji
(characters). As a result, more and more payments (especially utility bills)
are handled by convenience store chains, which have installed sophisticated
terminals.
Since the early 1990s more and more loans held by banks have turned
into nonperforming assets. Banks have suﬀered over JPY 6 trillion in loan
losses each year since ﬁscal year 1994 (table 5.2, row E). As a result, banks
have not reported positive net-operating proﬁt since ﬁscal year 1993 (row
F). However, because of occasional realization of capital gains on stocks
and real estate (row G), banks have shown a positive bottom line in some
years (row F   row G).
Clearly, the proﬁt margin of Japanese banks is too small to cover the in-
creased default risk after the crash of the bubble. Banks have not succeeded
in increasing their lending margin under a strong competitive pressure from


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.government-backed ﬁnancial institutions and weakened borrowers under
a deﬂationary economy. Moreover, under the terms and conditions of gov-
ernment capital injection in March 1999, banks are legally required to
maintain and increase loans to small- and medium-sized ﬁrms. Sinsei Bank,
which reduced loans to small- and medium-sized ﬁrms, was ordered to
increase such loans by the Financial Services Agency of Japan (FSA). Be-
cause of this situation, banks often disregard the internal model-based re-
quired lending margin to make new loans to small companies. Given these
poor lending market conditions, Citibank decided to signiﬁcantly reduce
consumer-loan business in Japan.5
Corresponding to the ﬂow-proﬁt ﬁgures, the capital position of Japa-
nese banks has been deteriorating. Under Japanese accounting rules for
banks and lenient application by the regulators, Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) capital ratios have been manipulated in many ways.
First, banks have underreserved against bad loans. This tends to increase
bank core capital by the same amount.
Second, banks have large deferred-tax assets on their balance sheets
even though they have been losing money continually since 1993 and loss
carry-forwards are limited to ﬁve years. There is little prospect of utilizing
the deferred-tax asset by showing genuine proﬁt in the near future, so it
should be written oﬀ.
Table 5.3shows the capital structure of major Japanese banks. In March
2003, more than 100 percent of tier I capital of Resona Bank and Mitsui
Trust Holdings consisted of deferred tax assets (present value of the future
tax shelter). More than one-half of the tier I capital of United Financial of
Japan (UFJ) and Sumitomo-Mitsui Financial Group corresponds to the
deferred tax asset. One-third of the tier I capital of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Group
is also the deferred tax asset. This situation improved somewhat one year
later. Except for UFJ Group, all the other banks’ reduced deferred tax as-
set. Resona bank could reduce deferred tax asset by the capital injection by
the government. The weakened UFJ Group is merging with the Mitsubishi
Tokyo Financial Group.
Third, friendly life insurance companies hold banks’ subordinated debts
and bank stocks. The banks, in turn, hold subordinated loans and surplus
notes of the life insurance companies. At the end of March 2003, Japanese
banks provided JPY 1.9 trillion of capital to ten major life insurance com-
panies. On the other hand, ten major life insurance companies held JPY
1.9 trillion of banks stocks and JPY 4.4 trillion of subordinated liabilities
of banks.6 This is double gearing, and the cross-held quasi capital should
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5. According to the March 16, 2003, edition of Japan Economic Journal, Japanese edition,
Citibank group would eliminate up to 500 consumer-loan oﬃces and about 2,000 employees
by the end of 2003.
6. See Fukao and Japan Center for Economic Research (2004, 133).not be treated as genuine capital for either the banks or the life insurance
companies.
The capital position of banks is quite sensitive to stock prices. Table 5.4
shows the capital structure of all commercial banks. Core capital based on
traditional historical cost accounting is adjusted for unrealized capital
gains on stocks, deferred taxes, the public capital injection, and underre-
serving for loan losses. Although banks showed JPY 24.8 trillion of capi-
tal on their balance sheet at the end of March 2003, this ﬁgure was inﬂated
with JPY 10.6 trillion of deferred-tax assets, JPY 5.4 trillion of under-
reserving, and JPY 7.3 trillion of government capital. Removing these
amounts, the privately held equity of the banking sector was only JPY 1.5
trillion. This is very small compared to the JPY 64.6 trillion of classiﬁed
loans and JPY 23.2 trillion of stocks held by banks.
In the early 1990s, unrealized capital gains (the diﬀerence between table
5.4 columns [A] and [B]) were very large and banks could withstand ﬂuc-
tuations in stock prices. However, in the 1990s, banks sold stock to realize
gains to oﬀset huge loan losses. The increase in book value of shares (col-
umn [B]) during the 1990s shows that the banks were buying back most of
the stock they had sold.
Table 5.5 shows the distribution of core capital ratios (leverage ratios) of
major Japanese banks. By adjusting the underreserving and deferred tax as-
sets, four banks had negative equity at the end of March 2003. The weighted
average capital ratio declined from 3.21 percent in March 2000 to 0.30 per-
cent in March 2003. Only two banks maintained more than 6 percent lever-
age ratios. One is Shinsei Bank, the former Long-Term Credit Bank of
Japan (nationalized in October 1998 and privatized in March 2000). The
other is Aozora Bank, the former Nippon Credit Bank (nationalized in
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Table 5.3 The ratio of deferred tax asset in the core capital of major Japanese banks
March 2004 March 2003
Core capital Net DTA Ratio Ratio
(billion yen) (billion yen) (%) (%)
(A) (B) (B/A) (B/A)
Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group 3,655 647 17.7 39.0
UFJ Group 2,149 1,397 65.0 57.1
Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group 3,567 1,666 46.7 58.1
Mizuho Financial Group 3,941 1,333 33.8 60.8
Chuo Mitsui Group 483 269 55.7 101.5
Resona Bank 892 53 5.9 109.6
Sumitomo Trust 790 141 17.9 37.4
Source: Disclosure materials of individual banks.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.December 1998 and privatized in December 2000). All other banks show
declining trends in the ratios.
To sum up, banks are losing money by high levels of loan losses and very
thin proﬁt margins. The banking sector is running out of capital, and the
banks are surviving with government guarantees of their liabilities. In or-
der to stabilize the banking sector, it is necessary to increase the lending
margin of banks. As we will see in the next section, borrowers are already
facing relatively high real interest rates due to the gradual acceleration of
deﬂation. Therefore, an increase in the average lending rate is likely to de-
press the Japanese economy and will aggravate the deﬂation. In order to
avoid this adverse eﬀect, it is necessary to raise nominal interest rates with-
out raising the real cost of debt for weakened borrowers. The only way to
do this is to stop deﬂation and have a mild inﬂation (table 5.6). By raising
trend inﬂation rate from minus 2 percent to plus 2 percent, for example,
banks can raise average lending rate from the current 2 percent to 4 per-
cent. At the same time, the real cost of debt for borrowers will fall from 4
percent to 2 percent.
We have to take note of the fact that a simple injection of government
capital to weakened banks would not stabilize the banking sector without
a bigger lending margin. Loss-making banks will deplete the injected
money sooner or later. In order to revitalize the banking sector without ag-
gravating deﬂation, the government has to do two things: allow banks to
obtain enough lending margin that is consistent with the expected credit
costs, and reduce real interest rates by stopping deﬂation.
Given the sharp recovery of stock prices and the improving performance
of borrowing ﬁrms, banks showed better results for the ﬁscal year ending
March 2004. The Nikkei index rose from 7,973 at the end of March 2003 to
11,715 one year later. This sharp recovery of stock prices increased the mar-
ket value of stocks held by banks by about JPY 5 trillion. The recovery of
the economy also reduced the loan-loss ﬁgures for most banks. On the other
hand, one major bank, Resona, and one regional bank, Ashikaga, were
eﬀectively nationalized in 2003. Resona group banks alone lost as much as
JPY 1,340 billion for ﬁscal year 2003, and Ashikaga banks also lost JPY 775
billion for the same ﬁscal year. This means that the banking sector is close
to the break-even point but not earning enough of a proﬁt margin to stand
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Table 5.6 Illustrative example of banking-sector proﬁt margin
Current situations Mild inﬂation
Lending rate (A) 2.0 4.0
Inﬂation rate (B) –2.0 2.0
Real interest rate (A) – (B) 4.0 2.0
Funding cost of banks (C) 0.2 1.0
Proﬁt margin (A) – (C) 1.8 3.0on its own feet. Probably, banks have to increase lending margin by about
50 to 100 basis points to make their lending reasonably proﬁtable.
5.4 Macroeconomic Policy under Large GDP Gap and Zero Interest Rate
The Bank of Japan (BOJ) is providing a large amount of monetary base,
but broadly deﬁned money supply is not increasing much (ﬁgure 5.6). As
the short-term interest rates moved close to zero, the monetary base was
hoarded by banks and short-term money market dealers and was held as
current deposits at the BOJ. Figure 5.7shows a phase diagram of monetary
base and nominal short-term interest rates since 1986, and it can be re-
garded as an empirical demand function for monetary base. When the
short-term nominal interest rate was between 1 and 8 percent, the mone-
tary base–GDP ratio moved between 7 and 9 percent. However, when the
short-term interest rate reached 0.5 percent in the summer of 1995, the de-
mand for monetary base became very elastic. The monetary base–GDP ra-
tio increased to 11 percent when the zero-interest-rate policy was adopted
in February 1999. From the start of the quantitative easing in March 2001
until the end of 2003, the ratio increased from 12.5 percent to more than 20
percent. The ﬂat part of ﬁgure 5.7 clearly shows that the Japanese economy
has been in a liquidity trap.
Figure 5.8 shows the reaction function of the BOJ in the face of the
falling inﬂation rate. The overnight call rate was reduced in line with the
GDP deﬂator inﬂation rate. A one-point fall in the deﬂation rate induced
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Fig. 5.6 Money supply developments
Source: Japan Center for Economic Research (2003).the BOJ to cut the nominal rate by 1.8 points, thereby reducing the real in-
terest rate by 0.8 points. The BOJ ran out of room for maneuvering when
the deﬂation rate fell down to minus 1.23 percent (1.23   2.21/1.80). The
bank faced the zero lower bound of the nominal interest rate.
In spite of the aggressive increase of monetary base by the BOJ, real in-
terest rates have been on a rising trend since mid-1998. Figure 5.9 shows
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Fig. 5.7 Demand for monetary base
Fig. 5.8 Inﬂation and short-term money rate (1991–2003)nominal and real interest rates since 1986. This ﬁgure shows the average
new lending rate of all banks and overnight call rates. The call rate indi-
cates the short-term interest rates for high-quality borrowers. On the other
hand, the average new lending rate indicates the borrowing costs for small
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Nominal rates are shown in dotted
lines and the real rates in solid lines. While the real and nominal interest
rates fell until 1998, the real rates started to rise because of the acceleration
of deﬂation.
Moreover, we have to pay attention to the fact that the gap between the
lending rates and the call rate gradually increased in the 1990s. In the
1980s, the diﬀerence between the lending rate and the call rate was very
small and less than 50 basis points. By the mid-1990s, the gap increased to
over 150 basis points. The increasing gap is the result of the decontrol on
deposit interest rates and the decline of market interest rates toward zero.
Banks lost regulatory rent from deposits in the early 1990s. As the market
rates fell toward zero in the 1990s, banks had to raise loan rates to main-
tain their proﬁt margin. The real new lending rate is close to 4 percent,
which is close to the booming bubble period in the late 1980s. Even the real
call rate is about 2 percent, which is much higher than the real short-term
market rate in the United States of the same period. The high real cost of
funding for SMEs is depressing economic activities.
Japan has been in a deﬂationary trap. High real interest rates due to de-
ﬂation have been depressing the economy. The depressed economy, in turn,
has accelerated deﬂation, and real interest rates rose further as a result.
Conventional open market purchase of government notes and bonds is no
longer eﬀective. Since interest rates on short-term treasury bills (TBs) are
220 Mitsuhiro Fukao
Fig. 5.9 Real and nominal interest rates
Note:Real interest rates are estimated with three-quarter moving average of GDP deﬂator in-
ﬂation rate (SAAR).very close to zero, they have become a perfect substitute for monetary base.
An open market purchase of TBs has no expansionary eﬀect because it is
an exchange of two perfectly substitutable assets. An open market pur-
chase of long-term government bonds is also ineﬀective because long-term
interest rates are extremely low and the BOJ cannot push down long-term
rates any lower.
Even in a liquidity trap, it is possible to consider unconventional monetary-
policy measures. The BOJ can buy stocks and/or real estate as instruments
of open market operations. The bank started to buy limited amounts of
stocks from banks in October 2003 so as to reduce the excessive market risk
of stock portfolios held by commercial banks. Because the amount was
very limited (the ceiling of the total purchase was initially set at JPY 2 tril-
lion in October 2003 and was increased to JPY 3 trillion in March 2003),
its expansionary eﬀect has been limited. The BOJ and the government can
also buy foreign-currency-denominated assets to weaken the yen. Since the
Ministry of Finance decides the intervention policy in the foreign exchange
market, the BOJ cannot use foreign exchange as an instrument of open
market operations by itself.
In 2003, the Ministry of Finance carried out massive foreign exchange
intervention to keep the yen weak (ﬁg. 5.10). Total purchase of foreign cur-
rencies, mostly U.S. dollars, amounted to JPY 20.4 trillion in 2003 and JPY
14.8 trillion in the ﬁrst quarter of 2004. This is a massive intervention be-
cause JPY 35.2 trillion amounts to 7 percent of Japan’s GDP. This foreign
exchange intervention is accompanied by the BOJ’s quantitative expansion
of the monetary base. The bank increased its monetary base by JPY 21 tril-
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Fig. 5.10 Japanese foreign exchange reserve and real yen-dollar rate
Source: Japan Center for Economic Research (2004).
Notes: Index is equal to 100 in February 1973. Real reserve   Nominal reserve (US$)  
Japanese GDP deﬂator/US GDP deﬂator/Japanese nominal GDP. Real exchange rate  
Nominal yen-dollar rate   (US GDP deﬂator/Japanese GDP deﬂator).lion from the end of 2002 to the end of March 2004. This intervention pol-
icy may have kept the yen relatively weak in 2003 and contributed to the re-
covery of the economy to some extent.
As a cost of this intervention policy, the Japanese government has in-
creased its foreign exchange exposure. The foreign exchange reserves
reached US$827 billion at the end of March and were equivalent to 17 per-
cent of GDP. A 10 percent fall of the U.S. dollar induces a capital loss of
1.7 percent of GDP to the Japanese government.
Regarding ﬁscal policy, the extremely large budget deﬁcit also makes it
very diﬃcult to use ﬁscal policy to stimulate the economy. Table 5.7 shows
the budgetary situations of the general government of Japan, including the
central government, local government, and the social security fund. The
gross debt–GDP ratio was already 158 percent at the end of 2003. With an
extremely large budget deﬁcit and stagnant nominal GDP, this ratio is
likely to increase by 8 to 9 points a year. The gross debt of the general gov-
ernment will reach 200 percent by 2008. Even though the net debt–GDP
ratio is still at 66 percent, it is likely to surpass 100 percent by 2008. More-
over, these ﬁgures do not include oﬀ-balance-sheet liabilities such as failing
national pension systems and loss-making government-owned companies.
At the time of this writing, the Japanese yen government bond (JGB) is
rated AA– by Standard & Poor’s and A2 by Moody’s, and these are the low-
est ratings among major countries. Unless the Japanese economy can get
out of deﬂation with the current economic recovery, I expect that the JGB
will be downgraded further. In that event, the government will have to shift
its funding from long-term bonds to short-term notes so as to reduce in-
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Table 5.7 Projection on general government budget deﬁcits
General General
Nominal Primary government government Effective Net
GDP growth balance–GDP gross debt–GDP net debt–GDP interest rate interest cost
Year growth rate ratio ratio ratio on net debt GDP ratio
1999 –1.4 –5.8 120.4 36.0 3.5 1.3
2000 0.8 –6.1 130.7 43.5 3.1 1.3
2001 –1.1 –4.7 142.0 51.0 2.8 1.4
2002 –1.5 –6.0 150.2 59.2 2.1 1.2
2003 0.1 –6.3 157.6 66.6 2.1 1.4
2004 0.0 –6.3 165.3 74.3 2.1 1.6
2005 0.0 –6.3 173.2 82.2 2.3 1.9
2006 0.0 –6.3 181.4 90.4 2.7 2.4
2007 0.0 –6.3 190.1 99.1 3.0 3.0
2008 0.0 –6.3 199.4 108.4 4.0 4.3
2009 0.0 –6.3 210.0 119.0 4.0 4.8
Source: Figures until 2003 are based on International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, and
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Economic Outlook.
Notes: General government gross asset is assumed to be constant after 2002. Sharp downgradings of
JGB are assumed after 2006.terest costs. However, the shortening maturity of JGB will increase the
funding vulnerability against a sharp rise in interest rates.
Such downgrading of government bonds would adversely aﬀect the inter-
national operations of Japanese ﬁnancial institutions and companies. Since
sovereign credit rating usually sets the ceiling rate for private companies,
they will face a rising funding cost in international ﬁnancial markets.
5.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we analyzed the causes of the persistent deﬂation in
Japan. We found that the deﬂation has been accelerating gradually since
the mid-1990s. Because of the acceleration of deﬂation, real interest rates
are rising and conventional monetary-policy tools have lost eﬀectiveness.
As we explained in the introduction, the Japanese economy started to re-
cover in 2003 due to the succession of propitious events. If the economy
can overcome deﬂation with this recovery, the Japanese episode of zero in-
terest rate will be over. However, we economists have to think hard to come
up with monetary-policy instruments that will be eﬀective even under a de-
ﬂation. One such instrument is the idea of a Gesell tax or the famous stamp
duty on money.7 By levying taxes on the outstanding amount of govern-
ment-guaranteed ﬁnancial assets, it is possible to set nominal return on
safe assets at a negative number. In other words, it is possible to overcome
the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates by introducing a new tax on
some ﬁnancial assets. In the following, I summarize my proposal in my ear-
lier paper.8
The government may levy a tax on the balance of all the government-
guaranteed ﬁnancial assets. Taxable assets include all the central and local
government liabilities; all the government-guaranteed assets, such as
postal saving deposits and postal life insurance policies; and all the yen li-
abilities of the banking sector that are eﬀectively guaranteed by the deposit
insurance system. In order to avoid tax loopholes, yen cash payments on
derivative transactions by banks should also be taxed. It is necessary to
levy tax on the monetary base, including banknotes and central bank de-
posits from private banks. In order to tax cash, the BOJ may print new
bank notes and levy fees for the exchange with old bank notes. Alterna-
tively, the government can levy stamp duty on old bank notes. Since tax-
able assets are the liabilities of the government bodies and the banking
sector, this tax can be implemented fairly easily under the current tax
collection system. The most messy part is the taxation on the bank notes.
All the automated teller machines and automatic vending machines need
adjustments for new notes.
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7. See chapter 23 of Keynes (1936). Goodfriend (2000) also discussed the possible taxation
on currency to ﬁght against deﬂation.
8. See Fukao (2003) for the details of this proposal.In order to have expansionary eﬀects, this Gesell tax has to be somewhat
higher than the rate of deﬂation. Given the recent deﬂation rate of 1 to 2
percent per annum, the tax rate can be set at around 2 percent. This tax has
to be levied repeatedly as long as deﬂation continues. The Gesell tax can be
regarded as a substitute for inﬂation tax on government liabilities. When
an economy experiences a steady and mild inﬂation, the government can
enjoy declining real value of its liabilities. This inﬂation tax has expan-
sionary eﬀects on the economy by encouraging rational economic agents
to invest in real assets. In a deﬂationary economy, the increasing real value
of safe assets has contractionary eﬀects on the economy.
This Gesell tax will have very strong expansionary eﬀects on expendi-
tures. People will shift assets from “safe” assets to risky assets. In other
words, people will shift from taxable assets to all the nontaxable assets.
Since stocks, real estate, corporate bonds, foreign bonds, and consumer
durables are not taxed, the demand for these assets will increase. The yen
exchange rate will also depreciate against foreign currencies. This tax will
also stimulate bank lending activities. Banks will shift assets from BOJ de-
posits and government bonds to loans and corporate bonds. Intercorpo-
rate credit will also expand because receivables are not taxed, but cash and
deposits will be taxed.
This tax will also generate a large amount of revenue for the government.
The total tax revenue of 2 percent tax on government-guaranteed ﬁnancial
assets would amount to about 28 trillion yen. The government could make
use of the tax revenue to reduce its budget deﬁcit, recapitalize deposit in-
surance funds, or improve its antiunemployment policy. It is possible to
sweeten this tax proposal by distributing cash to all the people living in
Japan. The cost of distributing 50,000 yen per person to everybody is 7 tril-
lion yen, and this cost is only one-quarter of the revenue from this tax.
One negative aspect of this tax is the possible negative eﬀect on the credit
rating of the Japanese government. For example, Moody’s Investors Ser-
vice states that an imposition of tax on the government liabilities may con-
stitute an event of partial default by the government. However, this is a rel-
atively minor problem because only a small portion of JGB is held by
foreign investors.
Appendix
Potential GDP and GDP gaps are estimated from the following data:
1. Real GDP, GDP deﬂator: Cabinet Oﬃce, Economic Social Research
Institute, quarterly series.
2. Capital stock: Cabinet Oﬃce, Economic Social Research Institute,
quarterly series. The data were adjusted to remove the gaps due to privati-
zation of Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Co. (1985 Q2), Japan Tobacco
224 Mitsuhiro FukaoCo. (1985 Q2), Electric Power Development Co. (1986 Q4), East Japan
Railway Co. (1987 Q2), and sales of new trunk lines from the government
to railway companies (1991 Q4).
3. Capacity utilization ratio for the manufacturing sector: Ministry of
Economy and Trade (METI), capacity utilization index for the manufac-
turing sector.
4. Capacity utilization ratio for the nonmanufacturing sector: Since there
are no statistics on the capacity utilization for the nonmanufacturing sec-
tor, we estimated the ratio by using the Bank of Japan Tankan statistics on
the diﬀusion index (DI) on capacity utilization. First, we estimated the re-
lationship between the capacity utilization ratio for the manufacturing sec-
tor (METI data) and Tankan DI of the same sector:
Manufacturing capacity utilization   109.18   0.53 
  Manufacturing Tankan DI.
By replacing Manufacturing Tankan DI with Nonmanufacturing DI, we
estimated the capacity utilization ratio for the nonmanufacturing sector
after 1991 Q1. Since there is no Tankan DI data for the nonmanufacturing
sector before 1990 Q4, we estimated nonmanufacturing-sector DI with the
following equation and manufacturing Tankan DI:
Nonmanufacturing DI    5.75   0.44   Manufacturing Tankan DI.
Both capacity utilization ratios are normalized to be 100 at their peaks.
Figure 5A.1 shows the estimated capacity utilization for nonmanufac-
turing as well as manufacturing sector capacity utilization.
5. Actual capital input: Estimated from the following equation:
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Fig. 5A.1 Capital utilization ratios of manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sec-
tors (manufacturing: 1990:4   100, nonmanufacturing: 1990:1   100)
Source: Japan Center for Economic Research (2004).Actual capital input  [(manufacturingsector capital stock)
 (manufacturing sector capacity utilization ratio)
 (nonmanufacturing-sector capital stock)
 (nonmanufacturing-sector capacity utilization 
ratio)] ÷100.
6. Potential capital input: Estimated from the following equation:
Potential capital input   Manufacturing-sector capital stock 
  Nonmanufacturing-sector capital stock.
7. Actual labor input: Actual labor input on a man-hour basis is estimated
by the following equation:
Actual labor input   Number of employees and self-employed 
  (Scheduled working hours 
  Overtime working hours).
Number of employees and self-employed: Ministry of Public Manage-
ment, Home Aﬀairs, Posts and Telecommunications, Statistics on Labor,
all industries.
Working hours: Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, Monthly Labor
Survey, average monthly working hours per employee in all establishments
of more than ﬁve workers. Figure 5A.2shows the development of scheduled
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Fig. 5A.2 Regular hours per worker
Source: Japan Center for Economic Research (2004).working hours. Because of the gradual introduction of the ﬁve-day work-
week in 1988 for large companies and in 1997 for small companies, the
scheduled hours declined twice.
8. Potential labor input: Potential labor input is estimated by connecting
the past peaks of all the variables in Actual labor input.
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Comment Piti Disyatat
Overview
The chapter provides a focused and interesting account of the causes of
persistent deﬂation in Japan, highlighting the implications that price de-
clines have had on the banking sector. The discussion is broadly divided
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the Bank of Thailand or Bank of Thailand policy.into two parts. The ﬁrst concentrates on linking persistent and accelerat-
ing deﬂation to the existence of a negative output gap, while the second fo-
cuses more on the macroeconomic impact of a deﬂationary environment
and implications for policy.
Although much of the chapter is descriptive in nature, the analysis does
point out a close link between the author’s estimated output gap and de-
velopments in the GDP deﬂator. In this regard, it would be useful if the
chapter clariﬁed a bit more the reasons behind focusing on the GDP deﬂa-
tor as a measure of prices rather than the CPI. On the state of the banking
system, the chapter lays out clearly the main reasons why things may ap-
pear better then they are. In particular, it points out hidden weaknesses in
banks’ capital position and highlights the fact that Japanese banks’ plight
is far from over. To gain a better appreciation of how extensive the prob-
lem is, it would be nice if more information on the cross-section variation
in banks’ balance sheets were provided (indeed, table 5.3 indicates sub-
stantial diﬀerences across banks and suggests that things are perhaps
worse for smaller banks).
The chapter could emphasize more the role that problems in the bank-
ing sector and sluggish loan growth have contributed to persistent deﬂa-
tion. What is needed to end deﬂation is an expansion in broader monetary
aggregates, since these are eﬀectively the balances that ultimately “chase”
real goods and services. But it is not that central banks can directly in-
crease broad-money supply and bank lending. They must do so through
the provision of funds to ﬁnancial institutions in exchange for bonds or for-
eign exchange. When credit markets function properly, this expansion in
loanable funds leads to a rise in the supply credit that underpins the in-
crease in broad money. However, given the ongoing banking-sector prob-
lems, monetary expansion through traditional channels may not be eﬀec-
tive in raising broad-money aggregates. The problem stems from lingering
balance-sheet weaknesses that continue to plague both the banking and
corporate sectors. At the same time, excess capacity and uncertainty about
future economic prospects have dampened the demand for credit. When
ﬁrms are not eager to raise funds and banks are not eager to lend, higher
liquidity in the banking system will not translate into higher liquidity in the
economy. In this way, the slow pace of banking and corporate restructur-
ing has contributed to the persistence of deﬂation in Japan.
Implications for Policy
The chapter stresses the need to improve banks’ proﬁtability through in-
creasing lending rates while at the same time not exacerbating real debt
burdens on borrowers. The only way in which this can be achieved is thus
through the attainment of a positive inﬂation rate. The chapter does not,
however, say how to achieve this. Indeed, given the large number of rec-
228 Mitsuhiro Fukaoommendations in the literature, it would have been nice to see where Fukao
stands on this issue.
More important, however, focusing on loan margins alone is unlikely to
solve the banking sector’s problem since much of it is a stock problem as-
sociated with credit quality. Indeed, given the low demand for loans, abun-
dant liquidity, and high degree of competition with respect to loan exten-
sion, it is unclear whether banks will actually be able to raise nominal loan
rates. Other potentially more productive ways to increase spreads include
(a) the moving of excess liquidity into loans; (b) the restructuring of non-
performing loans (NPLs) to yield positive returns again; and (c) the reso-
lution of NPLs and liquidation of foreclosed assets into cash that can be
invested.
The Japanese economy would certainly beneﬁt from a reestablishment
of consumer, business, and investor conﬁdence, which cannot happen un-
less the macroenvironment becomes supportive. From this perspective,
stopping deﬂation is a central element of the solution. However, it is only
a ﬁrst step. Many of the potential beneﬁts lie elsewhere. The chapter could
perhaps emphasize more the structural nature of the problem in Japan in
which deﬂation is only one of the symptoms. Policy initiatives should stress
the need for NPLs to be recognized at the appropriate prices and loans to
bankrupt companies not rolled over. Incentives for accelerated restructur-
ing and disposal of nonviable assets should be emphasized. At the same
time, any further public injection of money must be accompanied by strict
conditionality to make sure that the money is not used simply to prop up
the system.
The chapter could also elaborate more on the dangers associated with the
Japanese government’s ballooning debt stock. Such a discussion could also
usefully focus on the contingent liabilities of the government, including the
possibility of large marked-to-market losses associated with the rapid accu-
mulation of reserves that may occur should the U.S. dollar weaken further
and yields on U.S. treasuries rise (as many expect). In this regard, credibil-
ity of the medium-term ﬁscal consolidation can be enhanced by setting
clear medium-term debt targets.
Monetary Policy
To overcome the zero lower bound (ZLB) on interest rates, the chapter
suggests the introduction of a tax on money holdings. However, this is un-
likely to be either practical or desirable since it is the banks, not house-
holds, that are hoarding base money, and such a scheme may have adverse
implications for consumer conﬁdence. Also, if the tax encourages banks to
spend money when there is simply no loan demand, banks may be encour-
aged to take on more risk than they should.
More substantially, it should be stressed that the ZLB does not entail in-
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traditional methods of boosting aggregate demand, it does not prevent
central banks from turning to other means. In particular, short-term inter-
est rates are simply one intermediate target of monetary policy, and should
this cease to be a useful benchmark for policy, central banks can turn to
other targets (such as money supply or exchange rates). The real compli-
cation of the ZLB lies in the fact that switching operational targets intro-
duces uncertainty with respect to the size and lags of the economy’s re-
sponse to policy actions, making it harder to set policy targets to achieve
the desired eﬀect.
Finally, while much of the literature—this chapter included—has fo-
cused on the diﬃculties associated with how to conduct monetary policy
against the backdrop of deﬂation and a ZLB constraint, it is also unclear
how eﬀective policy will be once interest rates are positive because of ex-
cess liquidity problems in banks. In particular, with loan demand still weak
and plenty of funds to lend, the pass-through from changes in short-term
money market rates controlled by the central bank to retail rates may be
much smaller and slower than usual.
Overall, the chapter provides a succinct analysis of the key problems as-
sociated with deﬂation in Japan with an illuminating discussion of the state
of the banking system. That said, it paints a somewhat pessimistic picture
of the Japanese economy in contrast to recent data releases, which appear
to indicate a brighter prospect for sustained recovery.
Comment James Harrigan
Fukao covers a lot of ground in his chapter, and I agree with much of what
he says, particularly in his discussion of the ﬁnancial sector. I have some
questions about his analysis of the macroeconomic situation, however, and
that is where I will focus my remarks.
Fukao’s presentation of the Phillips curve is somewhat unusual, so it
may be useful to summarize his analysis. He uses three concepts of output.
The ﬁrst is actual real GDP as reported in the national accounts. In the
data used in the statistical model, no adjustment is made for the large and
growing bias in the GDP deﬂator, although the importance of this is dis-
cussed elsewhere in the text.
The second concept of output used is what is called “potential GDP.”
This is calculated in three steps:
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2. Calculate aggregate TFP from a Cobb-Douglas production function
using actual levels of capital and labor input,
ln TFP t   ln Yt   0.29 ln Kt   0.71 ln Lt.
3. Calculate the level of potential GDP as
ln Yt
max   ln TFP t   0.29 ln Kt
max   0.71 ln Lt
max.
This deﬁnition of potential GDP doesn’t seem like a useful number for
several reasons. First, this level is never attainable as a market equilibrium
or any other system of allocating resources. Second, the interpretation of
TFP is problematic. As is well known, measured aggregate TFP has an im-
portant cyclical component which partially reﬂects labor hoarding. As a
consequence, TFP growth will fall during periods of slack resource use
even if there has been no negative shock to underlying technological pos-
sibilities. Taking the trend in measured TFP, as Fukao does, will not solve
this problem in the Japanese case since resource use has been slack for so
long and will therefore aﬀect the estimated trend.
The ﬁnal output concept used is “natural GDP,” which is deﬁned as a
constant fraction of potential GDP,
Y t
n   0.97Y t
max.
The fraction 0.97 is estimated as part of the estimation of the Phillips curve
relationship. The Phillips curve is unorthodox, since it imposes purely
backward expectations that have a unit root (the sum of the coeﬃcients on
lagged inﬂation sum to one). A constant output gap leads to a constant
change in inﬂation, and the coeﬃcient on the output gap changes in 1994.
The dynamics of inﬂation implied by the Phillips curve can be summa-
rized as
  t   0.35 ln  1985 1993
  t   0.08 ln  1994 2003.
This statistical model is best interpreted as a reduced-form data descrip-
tion, rather than a structural model that explains how macro weakness has
led to deﬂation. The reason for this is that there is no role for forward-
looking expectations in this model, nor are there supply shocks.
Even as a purely reduced-form relationship, the equation is question-
able. The sharp drop in the estimated relationship between inﬂation and
output gap starting in 1994 is puzzling, especially since it appears from the









Financial Strains and the Zero Lower Bound 231esis that the true relationship is zero. If so, the model has rather surprising
implications: long-run inﬂation is a random walk after 1994.
More generally, Fukao’s macroeconomic analysis leaves many unan-
swered questions. Recession, deﬂation, insolvent banks, and a high govern-
ment debt are all jointly determined in principle and surely in practice,
which leaves causation unclear. In my view, the most important unanswered
questions are
• What exogenous shocks and/or policy errors caused the Lost Decade?
• What policies might extricate Japan from Lost Decade 2.0?
Fukao closes with some remarks about the ﬁscal position of the Japan-
ese state that stress the large gross debt. I agree with Broda and Weinstein’s
(2004) view that what matters for economic analysis of ﬁscal policy is the
government’s net debt, which Fukao acknowledges is far less alarming.
Finally, I think it is inappropriate to take seriously the rating down-
grades of Japanese government bonds. Taken literally, such downgrades
suggest that the probability of the Japanese state defaulting on the nomi-
nal value of bonds issued in yen is strictly greater than zero. Given that the
Japanese state can print an inﬁnite amount of yen at zero cost, my estimate
of default probability is zero.
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